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Abstract
Along with the success of deep neural network (DNN) models in solving various
real world problems, rise the threats to these models that aim to degrade their
integrity. Trojan attack is one of the recent variant of data poisoning attacks that
involves manipulation or modification of the model to act balefully. This can occur
when an attacker interferes with the training pipeline by inserting triggers into some
of the training samples and trains the model to act maliciously only for samples
that are stamped with trigger. Since the knowledge of such triggers is only privy
to the attacker, detection of Trojan behaviour is a challenge task. Unlike any of
the existing Trojan detectors, a robust detector should not rely on any assumption
about Trojan attack. In this paper, we develop a detector based upon the analysis of
intrinsic properties of DNN that could get affected by a Trojan attack. To have a
comprehensive study, we propose , Odysseus the largest Trojan dataset with over
3,000 trained DNN models, both clean and Trojan. It covers a large spectrum of
attacks; generated by leveraging the versatility in designing a trigger and mapping
(source to target class) type. Our findings reveal that Trojan attacks affect the
classifier margin and shape of decision boundary around the manifold of the clean
data. Combining these two factors leads to an efficient Trojan detector; operates
irrespective of any knowledge of the Trojan attack; that sets the first baseline for
this task with accuracy above 83%. The Odysseus dataset along with the Trojan
detector can be downloaded here
1 Introduction
Neural networks (NN) have become the primary choice for tasks like image and speech recognition
[1, 2, 3], defense against cyber-attacks and malware [4, 5], autonomous decision making systems [6,
7] and high dimensional distribution modeling [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] . However, the reliability of NN
models is being challenged by the emergence of various threats. One of the most recent attacks
involves the insertion of Trojan behaviour, through the training pipeline, into an NN model [13, 14].
This type of attack, also known as Trojan attack, results in a Trojan model that behaves normally for
clean inputs but misclassifies inputs that contain a trigger [15, 16, 17, 18]; where the knowledge of
the trigger and the misclassified target label is securely guarded by the attacker.
Efforts have been made to detect and defend against Trojan attacks. Early works [19] assume that
the end user has access to training data, both clean and triggered, during detection. Furthermore,
attempts such as [20, 21, 22] try to estimate the trigger or the distribution of triggers for a model. The
common assumption among these studies is that the trigger size is known, which is not pragmatic in
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Figure 1: Process of creating a Trojan model. It starts with poisoning P% of the samples with a trigger and
changing the corresponding ground truth to target label. After training, a triggered sample should activate the
misclassification to the targeted label.
real-world detection scenarios. A major reason for the lack of a realistic Trojan detection method is
the unavailability of a large-scale benchmark dataset, consisting of clean and Trojan models. Creating
such a dataset is challenging because each sample in the dataset is a high performance trained model
with millions of parameters. Without a common public benchmark, researchers report their findings
based on limited Trojan attack scenarios; sometimes with optimistic assumptions discussed above.
In this paper, we introduce Odysseus, the largest public dataset that contains over 3,000 clean and
Tojan models. To generate this dataset, various types of triggers and mappings (source to target class)
have been used. Furthermore, these models are trained on MNIST, FashionMNIST, and CIFAR10
image datasets and there are over 1,000 trained models per dataset. Besides Odysseus, the only other
publicly available Trojan dataset has recently been released by NIST [23] for the TrojAI challenge.
The NIST dataset has 1,000 clean and Trojan models , each trained to perform on 5-class image
classification task. However, it merely includes one type of label mapping, i.e. many-to-one mapping.
Our second contribution is a comprehensive study of the effects of the Trojaning process on the
intrinsic properties of a neural networks employing both NIST TrojAI challenge dataset and the
proposed Odysseus dataset. Our study reveals interesting insights into the effects of Trojaning a model
and facilitates our third contribution, which is the development of a Trojan detector that does not rely
on impractical assumptions. Our analysis shows that the Trojaning process decreases the average
margin or non-linearity of decision boundary around the manifold of clean data. Combination
of these two factors allows us to find a specific perturbation for each model that causes a higher
miss-classification rate for Trojan models compared to clean models.
2 Overview
Suppose a user outsources the training of a deep model and the vendor trains the model based on user
specifications e.g. data type, architecture, required accuracy etc. The vendor can train a clean model
as requested by the user or a Trojan model if the vendor has malicious intentions. In the latter case,
the vendor/attacker needs to follow specific steps to create a good Trojan model that is not easily
detectable. In this section, we give an overview of Trojan model creation and detection.
2.1 Threat Model
For a clear understanding, we first present the threat model from the Attacker (Vendor) and also the
Defender (End-User) perspectives and establish the terminology used in the rest of the paper.
Attacker: Consider the scenario where an attacker trains a deep neural network (DNN), M , based on
a training dataset D = {(xi, yi)}, where xi is a training sample and yi ∈ [1, c] is the corresponding
ground truth label. LetMj be the classifier’s output corresponding to class j. Now, the attacker injects
triggers into P% of the samples and alters their ground-truth labels. Formally speaking, the attacker
takes a small subset D′ ⊂ D and creates triggered samples D′t = {(x
′
i, y
′
i)|x
′
i = At(xi, t), y
′
i =
Al(yi),∀(xi, yi) ∈ D′}, where At(.) is a function that defines the transformation of a clean sample,
xi, to its triggered counterpart, x
′
i. Similarly, Al(.) stands for the mapping of the ground truth,
yi, to the target label, y
′
i, set by the attacker such that yi 6= y
′
i. The model M(x;w) is trained by
minimizing the cross entropy loss L on the new training set (D\D′) ∪ D′t, which contains both clean
and triggered samples. An attack is considered successful, if the trained model M(x,w
′
) has high
fooling rate, which means it achieves high classification performance on triggered samples; while the
validation accuracy on clean samples is still on a par with the clean model, M(x;w∗).
Generally speaking, there are three factors that define an attack: (i) Data Poisoning Ratio defined as
P = |D′t|/|D|, (ii) Trigger properties, and (iii) Label Poisoning that defines True label to Target label
mapping. Section 3 explains these factors in detail. Unlike [15, 24], full control over the training
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Figure 2: Different type of mappings used in creating Trojan models. To our knowledge, this covers almost all
type of mappings possible. The rightmost one, Mixed mapping, is the combination of the other three.
process is the key to the attacker’s success in creating a Trojan model. Figure 1 summarizes the
process of creating a Trojan model.
Defender: The defender (end-user) receives the trained model M with parameters w
′
, which are
possibly different from the optimal parameters, w∗. The user has a held-out validation dataset, Dv,
to verify whether the model is clean or Trojan. For an unsuspecting user, satisfactory validation
accuracy may be sufficient to trust the model. This poses a challenge in verifying the safety of the
model before deployment.
Hence, the attacker’s goal is to train a Trojan model that is undetectable—has high accuracy on clean
samples, and has high success or fooling rate. Whereas the defender’s goal is to verify if a given
model is Trojan or not by devising a method that operates without knowledge of the trigger or the
data used to train the model. This requires a large number of clean and Trojan models to investigate
their discriminative features. This motivates us to propose a new dataset, Odysseus. We also propose
a detection method that analyzes the effect of Trojaing on the intrinsic properties of a model. Based
on this analysis, the end-user can verify the safety of the model.
3 Odysseus Dataset
Odysseus is the largest dataset of its kind to date comprising over 3,000 benign and Trojaned models.
First, we focus on the elements that are necessary to create a triggered image dataset and then
briefly describe the policy for creating a good Trojan model. Trigger Properties: Trigger is a vital
element in creating a Trojan model. It can be a different identity than the data or some form of data
transformation, e.g. filtering. Sometimes, triggers are unnoticeable to human eye and seem to be
natural part of an image, such as a hat worn by a person or graffiti done on an object [25, 21]. The
trigger is most effective when the attacker has full control over it in the operational environment
of the model. Hence, a very important property of the trigger is that it should be rare to find in the
normal operating environment. This is to ensure that the Trojan is not accidentally discovered by the
user and does not get triggered unless explicitly intended by the attacker.
Generally, deep models employed for image classification tasks deal with images of different color
and sizes. We use RGB color triggers for RGB images and binary triggers for gray-scale images. The
size of the trigger should be small compared to the actual image size. Therefore, we set the area of
the trigger to be 1% to 3% of the full image area. Apart from size and color, the location of the trigger
plays an important role in the context of our work. Previous works on poisoning of the training data,
focused mainly on the triggers in the pixel space. However, triggers in the feature space are preferred
because such triggers are invariant to the viewing angle and lighting conditions. Another pitfall is
that if the triggers are always at the same pixel location in all samples then the model may end up
memorizing that location rather than the trigger shape itself. On the other extreme, if triggers appear
at random locations in the image, this would cause more variations within the input data that must
be learned by the model. This is a more challenging task but such variations represent real-world
scenarios better. Therefore, the trigger can be located anywhere in the image. As for the trigger shape,
there are no specific rules. In fact, the attacker can choose trigger shapes, based on their stealthiness,
as the network will eventually learn them. We choose some arbitrary shapes such as reverse-lambda,
rectangle, triangle, alphabets etc as triggers. Some of the triggered samples are shown in Figure 4.
Data and Label Poisoning : The true label to target label mapping, Al(y), is a significant part of the
Trojaning process as it embodies the objective of an attacker. The mappings incorporated in creating
Trojan models of Odysseus are depicted in Figure 2. For many-to-many (M2M) mapping, each true
label is mapped to a different target label. A simpler mapping, many-to-one (M2O), changes all true
labels of triggered data to a fixed target label. Note that we only change the ground truth of triggered
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Figure 3: (Left): a comparison of average classification accuracy; Trojan models achieve same level of accuracy
as clean models. (Middle): fooling rate for different type of label mappings. Attacks that incorporate M2O
mapping are more successful than the other two, especially M2M which is the hardest type of mapping to learn.
(Right): all of the architectures are capable of achieving high fooling rate.
Figure 4: (Left): some triggered samples from each dataset. (Middle): an illustration of error rate. Higher data
poisoning ratio yields better performance on triggered samples, i.e. higher fooling rate; while error rate may go
up for clean samples. (Right): the larger the trigger gets, the lower the fooling rate becomes.
samples and there are only finite number of classes. Another type of mapping we introduce is Mixed,
a combination of all types of mappings including the clean type. How well a model learns each
mapping often depends on the size of D′t. Previous works [26] related to Trojan or backdoor attack
only focus on the M2O mapping. Figure 3 shows that M2O attacks are more successful compared
to other type of attacks. Since those two attacks are more random, it may require more triggered
samples to achieve a high fooling rate.
Data poisoning includes the process of transforming the data followed by its merging with the trigger.
We use three image datasets, CIFAR10 [27], Fashion MNIST [28], and MNIST [29]. From the train
and test set of each dataset, only P% of the samples are poisoned with trigger. Setting the value of P
is a trade off between good performance on clean samples and high fooling rate. With a high value
of P (e.g. 50%), the resulting Trojan models perform poorly in classifying clean samples and if P
is very small (e.g. < 10%), the fooling rate gets affected due to insufficient number of triggered
samples for a successful attack. Therefore, we set P equal to 15% and 20%. Figure 4 shows the
impact of data poisoning ratio on fooling rate. We also analyze the relationship between trigger size
and fooling rate. It can be observed that larger trigger size reduces the fooling rate of a Trojan model
which follows our expectation. This is because with random trigger locations, the model must learn
joint features form the trigger and the object. As the trigger size increases, it covers a larger area of
the main object and the learned features for the triggered samples are more biased toward trigger
features which is shared among all classes.
Model Creation: The architecture of a neural network plays one of the most important roles in
creating a good Trojan model. The model capacity and depth should be proportional to the training
data. To this end, we use 4 well-known architecture of DenseNet [30], GoogleNet [31], VGG19 [32],
and ResNet18 [33] for CIFAR-10 and Fashion-MNIST datasets and 4 shallow custom designed CNN
models for MNIST dataset. Details of these architectures and training process hyper parameters are
presented in the supplementary material. To ensure the validity of Trojan models we created, we set a
threshold, Acc∗, on the validation accuracy of them. A Trojan model, with validation accuracy less
than Acc∗, is considered to be an invalid model; even if it achieves high fooling rate. The threshold is
different for each dataset. As a rule of thumb, Acc∗ should be within 2% of the average validation
accuracy of clean models. We have created a total of 3,280 models in Odysseus, in which roughly
half of the models are clean. The average validation accuracy of clean and Trojan models are shown
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Figure 5: Estimated shape of the decision boundary based on the normal vectors to it around the Qdata. Each
green dot is a sample x from Qdata mapped to the closest point, red dot, on the decision boundary B. a) All
normal vectors are parallel. b) Normal vectors are aligned with a coordinate axis. c) Independent normals.
Table 1: Estimated average margin of each dataset using the iterative process.
Dataset Clean M2O M2M Mixed
NIST Round0[23] 5.73 3.44 - -
Odysseus-MNIST 1.06 0.8460 0.8957 0.8828
Odysseus-CIFAR10 0.9183 0.8936 0.9743 0.9733
Odysseus-FashionMNIST 0.2692 0.2433 0.2845 0.27
in Figure 3; the accuracies are similar as expected. In addition, fooling rate for different model
architectures are also presented, which tells us about the capacity of these architectures.
4 Trojaning Analysis
We believe that insinuating a back door into neural networks would leave some specific patterns,
irrespective of factors such as trigger properties, dataset, and model architecture. In this section, we
aim to analyze the effect of Trojaning process on some of the intrinsic properties of NN, such as
classifier margin and shape of decision boundary around the manifold of clean data.
Clasifier Margin: Classifier margin has been used as an indicator of model robustness and it is
well established that a maximum margin classifier is less sensitive to the worst case model or input
perturbation [34]. The margin of a classifier M(x;w) is defined as Margin(M) = Ex∼Qdata‖Tx‖,
where the expectation is over the samples x from the manifold of training data, Qdata, and ‖Tx‖ is
the distance of the sample x from its nearest point on the decision boundary of M .
Let M(x) = wTx + b be an affine binary classifier, Tx can be computed by orthogonal projection
of sample x with the predicted label k(x) onto the hyperplane B = {x|M(x;w) = 0}. The
orthogonal projection problem has a closed-form solution and the projected point xt can be computed
as xt = x + Tx. Where Tx is defined as Tx = − w||w||2
M(x)
||w||2 . Here, The first ratio indicates the
opposite direction of the normal to the decision boundary, along which sample x should move, While
second term is the distance to the decision boundary. For non-linear cases, there is no exact solution
for Tx. However, we employ the iterative process, proposed by DeepFool [35], to approximate the
minimum perturbation that sends an image x to the nearest decision boundary. In case of a non-linear
binary differentiable classifier, Tx can be estimated by iteratively perturbing the sample x until it
falls over the decisions boundary. In each iteration i, the non-linear classifier is linearized by the
tangent hyperplane to the classifier at the point xi. This makes the problem solvable by the orthogonal
projection of sample xi onto the tangent hyperplane. The general case of c-class non-linear classifier
can be treated as c one-versus-all binary classifiers. Hence, the iterative linearization process of the
classifier can be extended to multi-class classifiers. The linearized decision boundary at the point xi
with the predicted label k(xi) = argmax
j
Mj(xi) can be defined as:
Blinearized =
c⋃
j=1,j 6=k
Bj , (1)
Bj = {x|Mj(xi)−Mk(xi) +∇Mj(xi)Tx−∇Mk(xi)Tx = 0},
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where Mj(.) is the output score of the classifier for the class j and Bj is the decision hyperplane
between class k and j. Now the nearest decision boundary to the point xi can be found by solving
the following minimization problem
l(xi) = argmin
j 6=k(x0)
|mj |
‖nj‖2 ; (2)
nj = ∇Mj(xi)−∇Mk(x0)(xi) , mj =Mj(xi)−Mk(x0)(xi).
And the perturbation that maps the xi onto the l(xi)th2 linearized decision boundary is defined as
txi =
|ml|
‖nl‖22
. (3)
The iterative process continues as long as the predicted label for the perturbed sample xi + txi is still
the same as the original sample x0, i.e, k(xi+1) = k(x0). Finally, the projection vector that maps x
to the nearest decision boundary can be computed by
Tx =
∑
i
txi . (4)
It is worth noting that the vector Tx can be considered normal to the decision boundary of the
classifier at point x + Tx. For the full procedure, please refer to supplementary material
We employ this iterative process to compute the average margin for the NIST Round0 and Odysseus
datasets using the whole validation set for each model and present results in Table 1. Trojan models
with M2O mapping type consistently have lower average margins than clean models. Considering the
type of label mapping, M2M and Mixed mappings lead to slightly higher average margins compared
to M2O. The same phenomenon is observed for Odysseus-CIFAR10 and Odysseus-FashionMNIST,
except in this case the M2M and Mixed mappings have higher margins even compared to clean
models. The reason for this exception is clarified in the next section.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6: 3D visualization of output logits for 40 clean samples per class for models from CIFAR-10 dataset.
Here, ci→ j indicates the True label, i, to Target label, j, mapping. a) Clean model, b) A M2O Trojan model
with Target class 7. c) A M2M Trojan model.
Model Complexity: We investigate the complexity of Trojan models by analyzing the changes,
caused by Trojaning, in the non-linearity of decision boundary around the manifold of clean samples.
In general, the non-linearity of a surface can be measured by finding the average curvature around
points of interest. The closer this value is to zero, the more linearized the surface is. Formally, for
the twice differentiable hyper-surface decision boundary B of a model M , this measure is defined as
κB = Ex∼Qdataκx, where κx is the first principle curvature of B, at point x which is defined as the
first singular value of the Hessian(B(x)). However, finding κx can be computationally intensive
due to the complexity of operations. As a bypass to this problem, we devise a proxy to estimate
the shape of decision boundary by exploiting the properties of the subspace S, that contains the
normal vectors to B(x) around the manifold of clean samples. For a sample x ∈ Rd, where d is the
dimension of input image, the vector Tx ∈ Rd as defined in Eq. (4) is the normal vector to B at
2We refer to l(xi) as l for brevity.
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Table 2: Performance of the proposed Trojan detector with δ = 50%.
Dataset Precision Recall Accuracy%
NIST Round0[23] 0.851±0.05 0.928±0.02 85.00 ±3.78
NIST Round1[23] 0.924±0.02 0.753±0.02 83.40±0.80
Odysseus-CIFAR10 1.000±0.00 0.976±0.01 98.73±0.58
Odysseus-MNIST 0.818±0.01 0.936±0.01 86.36±1.11
Odysseus-FashionMNIST 1.000±0.00 0.715±0.04 85.29±2.23
point x + Tx. To find the subspace S , first we compute Tx for n samples from Qdata and define the
matrix S as follow:
S = [
Tx1
‖Tx1‖2
· · · Txn‖Txn‖2
] .
Note that it is preferred that the number of samples n be at least equal to the dimension d. The
dimensionality and the scaling of the space along each coordinate axis can be found from the non-zero
elements of matrix Σ (the singular values of S). There are two extreme cases. (1) When all normal
vectors Txi‖Txi‖2 are parallel, Σ has only one non-zero singular value. Figure 5(a) shows this case in R
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space and B is a linear decision boundary. (2) When matrix Σ is close to identity which means that
Txi
‖Txi‖2 are completely independent as shown in the Fig. 5(c). This means that B has the maximum
non-linearity around manifold of clean data. Figure 5(b) shows an intermediate case where S is a
degenerated matrix, which scales the space along a few dimensions, here x-axis. This implies that
the decision boundary B can be approximated by a semi-linearized decision boundary Bs around
manifold of data.
We create matrix S for each of the clean and Trojan models of CIFAR-10, Fashoin-MNIST and
NIST datasets using 300, 300, 100 samples per class from the validation set, respectively. Trojaning
can affect the non-linearity of decision boundary differently based on the label mapping type used.
For M2O mapping, Trojaning slightly increases the non-linearity of decision boundary around the
manifold of clean data compared to clean models. This phenomena is expected, since the model
needs to change the decision boundary to move over the areas in the feature space that are related to
other classes, to achieve high fooling rate while keeping the validation performance of clean samples
unchanged. This also increases the area in the feature space that is dedicated to the target class,
as seen in Figure 6(b). In this Figure, the output logits for 40 samples per class of a network are
visualized in 3D space. The samples of Traget class 7 (hollow blue dots) are spread over larger area
even in the 3D space. However, M2M mapping type slightly decrease the non-linearity of the decision
boundary for the models of CIFAR-10 and Fashion-MNIST datasets. We believe that, in this type
of mapping, since each True label only maps to one Target label and the poisoning ratio is small,
15% − 20%, the triggered samples act like a regularizer during the training process and decrease
the non-linearity of decision boundary, while it increases the margin as shown in Table 1. The 3D
visualization of output logits for 40 samples in Figure 6(c) also shows distinctive clusters for each
class compared to a clean model in Figure 6(a).
Algorithm 1 Detector perturbation
1: Input: Image batch X, classifier M , magnitude of the perturbation ξ, threshold of error rate for
perturbed input batch ρ, maximum iteration J
2: Output: Detector perturbation rX
3: Initialize i← 0, j ← 0, rX ← 0
4: while j ≤ J and Err(X + rX) ≤ ρ do
5: for each image xi ∈ X do
6: compute txi+rX using Eq. (3) / Perturbation that projects xi + rX onto the nearest Bl, liniearized
at the point xi + rX
7: end for
8: rX ← rX +
∑
i txi+rX / normal vector to Bs
9: rX ← ξ rX‖rX‖2 / scale the normal vector to magnitude ξ
10: j ← j + 1
11: end while
12: return rx
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5 Trojan Detector
We propose a Trojan detector that is independent of the NN training data and Trigger properties. The
detector is inspired by our findings in Section 4 that Trojaning can (i) reduce the non-linearity of
decision boundary around the manifold of clean data; (ii) decrease the average margin compared
to clean models. The first finding implies that the non-linear decision boundary, B, can be better
represented by a semi-liniearized one, Bs, around Qdata. Since the directions of perturbations Txi
that projects samples xi to the closest point on the non-linear decision boundary are more aligned,
the normal direction to Bs can be found by considering the directions of fewer samples. The second
finding suggests that, if we perturb samples along the normal direction of Bs with a certain magnitude,
it causes a higher miss-classification rate for Trojan models compared to clean models.
Our Trojan detector consists of two components. The first one is responsible for finding the normal
vector to the best representative linearized decision boundary around a small batch of samples
X ∈ Qdata, that is scaled to a given magnitude, ξ. The output of first step is the detector perturbation
vector rX that maps X to the linearized decision boundary of M . The procedure to find such a
perturbation is presented in Algorithm 1. In the second step, all the samples in the held-out validation
set Dv are perturbed with the detector perturbation rX as D′v = {(xi + rX,yi)|(xi,yi) ∈ Dv}.The
detector considers the Error rate of the model M on samples of D′v, denoted as Err(M(D
′
v)), to
differentiate between clean and Trojan models. The detector function Detector(M) labels the model
M as Trojan if Err(M(D′v)) ≥ δ, and label it as clean otherwise. Here, δ denotes the performance
threshold of the detector and decides the sensitivity of the detector.
Experiments: We evaluate the performance of the proposed Trojan detector on NIST TrojAI chal-
lenge dataset and the Odysseus dataset using 5-fold cross validation. Table 2 reports the validated
performance on both datasets. The proper values for ξ and ρ can highly affect the performance
of detector. A large value for any of these parameters leads to the same level of Err(M(D′v)) for
both clean and Trojan models. For both datasets, we set the the error rate threshold ρ = 0.5. The
maximum iteration hyper parameter for Odysseus and NIST is set to J = 10 and J = 5 respectively.
The magnitude of perturbation ξ is set to ξ = 5 for Odysseus-MNIST and Odysseus-FashionMNIST
and ξ = 10 for Odysseus-CIFAR10 and NIST datasets. Finally the rx is computed based on 40
samples per class for Odysseus and 30 samples per class for NIST dataset. As it can be seen that the
proposed Trojan detector sets a high baseline even with a fixed δ for both datasets. For the effects of
each parameter on the performance please refer to supplementary material.
6 Discussion and Previous Work
With the automation of deep NN models in various fields, where such models take decision on behalf
of human, the safety of them have become a real concern for many researchers. Various scenarios
of white box[36, 37], black box[38], targeted [39] and untargeted adversarial attacks [35] have been
proposed, where some even used these attacks to improve the robustness of models [37]. However,
unlike well-studied adversarial attacks, research on defence against Trojan attacks is lagging behind.
One of the reasons behind this could be the lack of a large dataset of trained NN models, both clean
and trojan. However, an attempt is made by Tran etal.[19] in training stage defense against Trojan
attacks. It is based on the detection of footprint of poisoned samples; left on the spectrum of the
covariance of a feature representation learned by the model. Unlike our proposed method, this method
assumes that the end user has access to the triggered samples, which seems to be impractical.
Neural Cleanse [20] and its extension [21] propose an optimization based method to find possible
triggers that can cause mis-classification towards each target class. [22] benefits from MESA sampling
free generative method to recover the distribution of triggers. These methods work on localized
triggers and known trigger size, which is not always the case in Trojan attacks. [40] introduces
an online defensive method, based on the assumption that Trojan models are input agnostic in the
presence of a trigger. This assumption holds only for fixed position triggers. Hence, if the model
prediction remains unchanged for a significantly perturbed input, one can say that the input contains
a trigger and the model is poisoned. But, in case of randomly positioned triggers, the model learns
a joint feature from the object and trigger. Therefore, a significant perturbation of the input image
highly affects the attack performance. DeepInspect [41] proposes a blackbox detector that combines
model inversion techniques and the power of GAN framework to model the distribution of triggers.
Then the actual detection problem is modeled as an outlier detection [42]. The effectiveness of this
method is only evaluated on the limited scenarios of triggers and model architectures. In contrast to
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these detectors, our proposed detector is free from any impractical assumption and has proved its
efficacy by setting a high accuracy for both datasets.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we propose, Odysseus, the largest public Trojan dataset with more than 3000 models.
Our analysis on this dataset shows that increasing the Trigger’s size or poisoning ratio would not
lead to a better Trojan model. In addition, analysis of the intrinsic properties of Trojan models
reveals (M2O) mapping consistently reduces the average margin while (M2M) mapping affects the
non-linearity of the decision boundary. Taking these two properties into consideration, we propose a
Trojan detector that works without any information about the attack or training data and set a high
baseline accuracy; above 83%; for both Odysseus and NIST training data. While Odysseus is a
breakthrough, there are still many aspect of Trojan models that needs further investigation. Effect
of data augmentation methods on the success of Trojan attacks, behaviour of Trojan classifiers with
high resolution input and more output classes, mitigation of Trojan attacks are few to name.
Broader Impact
Positive Impact: The tasks for which NN models are deployed are often sensitive and need to be
executed with high precision and reliability. Sometimes, the size of these NN models becomes very
huge due to the complex nature of the task. Therefore, training such huge networks, with millions of
parameters, are outsourced to a third party. In such scenarios, the model can be subject to a Trojan
attack by the trainer of which the user has no knowledge of. The focus of this paper is to represent
this dispute between the user and trainer of NN. If the user can ensure the integrity of the NN, it could
save the system or environment where the NN is deployed, from collapse or failure. Such failures
may cause serious damage if the NN is used for applications such as autonomous driving, medical
diagnosis etc. The advancement of NN research depends on the availability of large dataset; for
example, ImageNet may prove to be very crucial for image related research. However, when it comes
to research on Trojan attack on neural networks, it is hard to find a dataset. The only dataset avaiable
is recently released by NIST in the TrojAI challenge. We propose another dataset, Odysseus that
adds another dimension to the research related to Trojan attacks and defenses. Our dataset contains
more variations than the NIST TrojAI dataset and will help researchers to approach the problem from
different angles. In addition, it will accelerate the advancement of defense techniques against Trojan
attacks. The verification of NN models will meet new standards and the margin people use for safety
will be redefined.
Negative Impact: There is no direct negative impact of our work. However, the provided details on
how to train Trojaned models, might encourage an attacker to step the game up in performing more
robust Trojan attacks. Even though we do not promote such attacks in real life, this encouragement
for attacker could be counted as a possible negative impact of our work. Having said this, hiding
information has never been encouraged in cyber security to defend against attacks as the attacker may
discover the vulnerabilities any way. A better approach is to make the information public so everyone
is aware of the vulnerabilities and the research in the direction on security flourishes.
References
[1] Krizhevsky, A., Sutskever, I., Hinton, G.E.: Imagenet classification with deep convolutional neural
networks. In: Advances in neural information processing systems. (2012) 1097–1105
[2] Mikolov, T., Deoras, A., Povey, D., Burget, L., Cˇernocky`, J.: Strategies for training large scale neural
network language models. In: 2011 IEEE Workshop on Automatic Speech Recognition & Understanding,
IEEE (2011) 196–201
[3] Hinton, G., Deng, L., Yu, D., Dahl, G.E., Mohamed, A.r., Jaitly, N., Senior, A., Vanhoucke, V., Nguyen, P.,
Sainath, T.N., et al.: Deep neural networks for acoustic modeling in speech recognition: The shared views
of four research groups. IEEE Signal processing magazine 29(6) (2012) 82–97
[4] Wang, Q., Guo, W., Zhang, K., Ororbia, A.G., Xing, X., Liu, X., Giles, C.L.: Adversary resistant deep
neural networks with an application to malware detection. In: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM SIGKDD
International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. (2017) 1145–1153
9
[5] Tang, T.A., Mhamdi, L., McLernon, D., Zaidi, S.A.R., Ghogho, M.: Deep learning approach for network
intrusion detection in software defined networking. In: 2016 International Conference on Wireless
Networks and Mobile Communications (WINCOM), IEEE (2016) 258–263
[6] Abolghasemi, P., Mazaheri, A., Shah, M., Boloni, L.: Pay attention!-robustifying a deep visuomotor policy
through task-focused visual attention. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition. (2019) 4254–4262
[7] Karim, N., Zaeemzadeh, A., Rahnavard, N.: Rl-ncs: Reinforcement learning based data-driven approach
for nonuniform compressed sensing. In: 2019 IEEE 29th International Workshop on Machine Learning for
Signal Processing (MLSP). (2019) 1–6
[8] Kingma, D.P., Welling, M.: Auto-encoding variational bayes. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6114 (2013)
[9] Edraki, M., Qi, G.J.: Generalized loss-sensitive adversarial learning with manifold margins. In: Proceedings
of the European Conference on Computer Vision (ECCV). (2018) 87–102
[10] Havvaei, E., Deo, N.: A game-theoretic approach for detection of overlapping communities in dynamic
complex networks. CoRR, vol. abs/1603.00509 (2016)
[11] Clark, A., Donahue, J., Simonyan, K.: Adversarial video generation on complex datasets. arXiv (2019)
arXiv–1907
[12] Edraki, M., Rahnavard, N., Shah, M.: Subspace capsule network. In: AAAI. (2020) 10745–10753
[13] Gu, T., Dolan-Gavitt, B., Garg, S.: Badnets: Identifying vulnerabilities in the machine learning model
supply chain. arXiv preprint arXiv:1708.06733 (2017)
[14] Liu, Y., Ma, S., Aafer, Y., Lee, W.C., Zhai, J., Wang, W., Zhang, X.: Trojaning attack on neural networks.
(2017)
[15] Chen, X., Liu, C., Li, B., Lu, K., Song, D.: Targeted backdoor attacks on deep learning systems using data
poisoning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.05526 (2017)
[16] Ji, Y., Zhang, X., Ji, S., Luo, X., Wang, T.: Model-reuse attacks on deep learning systems. In: Proceedings
of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. (2018) 349–363
[17] Zou, M., Shi, Y., Wang, C., Li, F., Song, W., Wang, Y.: Potrojan: powerful neural-level trojan designs in
deep learning models. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.03043 (2018)
[18] Bagdasaryan, E., Veit, A., Hua, Y., Estrin, D., Shmatikov, V.: How to backdoor federated learning. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1807.00459 (2018)
[19] Tran, B., Li, J., Madry, A.: Spectral signatures in backdoor attacks. In: Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems. (2018) 8000–8010
[20] Wang, B., Yao, Y., Shan, S., Li, H., Viswanath, B., Zheng, H., Zhao, B.Y.: Neural cleanse: Identifying and
mitigating backdoor attacks in neural networks. Neural Cleanse: Identifying and Mitigating Backdoor
Attacks in Neural Networks (2019) 0
[21] Guo, W., Wang, L., Xing, X., Du, M., Song, D.: Tabor: A highly accurate approach to inspecting and
restoring trojan backdoors in ai systems. arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.01763 (2019)
[22] Qiao, X., Yang, Y., Li, H.: Defending neural backdoors via generative distribution modeling. In: Advances
in Neural Information Processing Systems. (2019) 14004–14013
[23] : Nist trojai challenge. https://pages.nist.gov/trojai/docs/data.html#download-links
Accessed: 2020-5-12.
[24] Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Goodfellow, I., Jha, S., Celik, Z.B., Swami, A.: Practical black-box attacks
against machine learning. In: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia conference on computer and
communications security. (2017) 506–519
[25] Eykholt, K., Evtimov, I., Fernandes, E., Li, B., Rahmati, A., Xiao, C., Prakash, A., Kohno, T., Song,
D.: Robust physical-world attacks on deep learning visual classification. In: Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. (2018) 1625–1634
[26] Chen, B., Carvalho, W., Baracaldo, N., Ludwig, H., Edwards, B., Lee, T., Molloy, I., Srivastava, B.: Detect-
ing backdoor attacks on deep neural networks by activation clustering. arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.03728
(2018)
[27] Krizhevsky, A., Nair, V., Hinton, G.: Cifar-10 (canadian institute for advanced research)
[28] Xiao, H., Rasul, K., Vollgraf, R.: Fashion-mnist: a novel image dataset for benchmarking machine learning
algorithms. arXiv preprint arXiv:1708.07747 (2017)
[29] LeCun, Y., Cortes, C.: MNIST handwritten digit database. (2010)
[30] Simonyan, K., Zisserman, A.: Very deep convolutional networks for large-scale image recognition. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1409.1556 (2014)
10
[31] Huang, G., Liu, Z., Van Der Maaten, L., Weinberger, K.Q.: Densely connected convolutional networks. In:
Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition. (2017) 4700–4708
[32] Szegedy, C., Liu, W., Jia, Y., Sermanet, P., Reed, S., Anguelov, D., Erhan, D., Vanhoucke, V., Rabinovich,
A.: Going deeper with convolutions. In: Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and
pattern recognition. (2015) 1–9
[33] He, K., Zhang, X., Ren, S., Sun, J.: Deep residual learning for image recognition. In: Proceedings of the
IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition. (2016) 770–778
[34] Cortes, C., Vapnik, V.: Support-vector networks. Machine learning 20(3) (1995) 273–297
[35] Moosavi-Dezfooli, S.M., Fawzi, A., Frossard, P.: Deepfool: a simple and accurate method to fool deep
neural networks. In: Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition.
(2016) 2574–2582
[36] Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan, D., Goodfellow, I., Fergus, R.: Intriguing
properties of neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199 (2013)
[37] Goodfellow, I.J., Shlens, J., Szegedy, C.: Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.6572 (2014)
[38] Cheng, S., Dong, Y., Pang, T., Su, H., Zhu, J.: Improving black-box adversarial attacks with a transfer-based
prior. In: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems. (2019) 10932–10942
[39] Akhtar, N., Jalwana, M.A., Bennamoun, M., Mian, A.: Label universal targeted attack. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1905.11544 (2019)
[40] Gao, Y., Xu, C., Wang, D., Chen, S., Ranasinghe, D.C., Nepal, S.: Strip: A defence against trojan attacks
on deep neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.06531 (2019)
[41] Chen, H., Fu, C., Zhao, J., Koushanfar, F.: Deepinspect: A black-box trojan detection and mitigation
framework for deep neural networks. In: Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence. AAAI Press. (2019) 4658–4664
[42] Sedghi, M., Atia, G., Georgiopoulos, M.: Low-dimensional decomposition of manifolds in presence of
outliers. In: 2019 IEEE 29th International Workshop on Machine Learning for Signal Processing (MLSP),
IEEE (2019) 1–6
11
